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NOTE
STATE REGULATION OF HOSTILE
TAKEOVERS: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF THIRD GENERATION BUSINESS
COMBINATION STATUTES AND THE
ROLE OF THE COURTS
Due to the regulatory burdens associated with a proxy con-
test,' the 1960s witnessed the emergence of the "hostile takeover"2
I See Brown, The Role of the Courts in Hostile Takeovers, 93 DICK. L. REV. 195, 197
n.4 (1989) (proxy contests were "subject to the regulatory strictures of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934"); Note, The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer" Under the Securi-
ties Act of 1934, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1250, 1253-54 (1973) ("Federal regulatory statutes re-
quired comprehensive advance disclosure from.., proxy challengers"); see also 15 U.S.C. §
78n(a)-(c) (1988) (federal statute regulating proxy solicitations). See generally E. ARANOW &
H. EINHORN, PROXY CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 81-139 (1957) (discussing SEC regu-
lation of proxy solicitations).
A proxy contest has been defined as "a dispute between groups attempting to retain or
gain control of the board of directors of a company by using the proxy device to gather
sufficient voting support." 5 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORA-
TIONS § 2052.2 (rev. perm. ed. 1987). See generally E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra, passim
(comprehensive work on topic of proxy contests).
2 See Brown, supra note 1, at 196. A "hostile takeover" occurs when one entity, the
predator, acquires control of another, the target, through the acquisition of stock, despite
resistance by the target's management. See id. at 197; see also Prentice, The Role of States
in Tender Offers: An Analysis of CTS, 1988 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 1, 4 (1988) (defining hos-
tile tender offer). See generally J. BROOKS, THE TAKEOVER GAME passim (1987) (effect of
takeovers on Wall Street); M. JOHNSTON, TAKEOVER passim (1986) (work on major players in
takeover game); A. MICHEL & I. SHAKED, TAKEOVER MADNESS passim (1986) (compilation of
specific takeover bids); CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES passim (A.
Auerbach ed. 1988) [hereinafter CORPORATE TAKEOVERS] (collection of articles on takeovers).
A "hostile takeover" is usually implemented through a "tender offer," see Brown, supra
note 1, at 197, which is "conventionally understood [as] a publicly made invitation ad-
dressed to all shareholders of a corporation to tender their shares for sale at a specified
price." Note, supra note 1, at 1251; see Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 626 n.1 (1982)
(definition cited by Court). See generally 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS &
FREEZEOUTS § 1.1-1.2 (1978) (discussion of tender offers); Chester, Definition of "Tender
Offer", in TENDER OFFERS 310-15 (M. Steinberg ed. 1985) (describing term "tender offer" as
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as the predominant method of corporate acquisition.' Initially
takeovers were a virtually unregulated area,4 and the opportunity
for potential abuse5 led to both state and federal legislative inter-
vention.6 Thereafter, a conflict developed as "first generation"
state antitakeover statutes7 were constitutionally attacked on both
elusive); Note, Target Directors' Fiduciary Duties: An Initial Reasonableness Burden, 61
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 722, 722 n.1 (1986) (how courts define "tender offer").
3 See Warren, Developments in State Takeover Regulation: MITE and Its Aftermath,
40 Bus. LAW. 671, 672 (1985) (dramatic rise in level of cash offers for equity securities pre-
ceded 1960's regulation); Note, The Constitutionality of Second Generation Takeover Stat-
utes, 73 VA. L. REV. 203, 203 (1987) (tender offer emerged as effective and popular method
of gaining control of a publicly held corporation in the 1960's); Comment, State Takeover
Legislation After CTS: Does It Give States a Free Hand To Regulate Tender Offers?, 13
DEL. J. CORP. L. 1029, 1029 (1988) (due to speed and lack of regulation, cash tender offer
replaced proxy contest as most popular mode of gaining corporate control).
See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Respond-
ing to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1162 (1981); see also Johnson, The Eventual
Clash Between Judicial and Legislative Notions of Target Management Conduct, 14 J.
CORP. L. 35, 66 (1988) (only common law principles regulated cash tender offers prior to
1968); Warren, supra note 3, at 672-73 (tender offer almost free of government regulation in
1960's); Note, Beyond MITE-CTS v. Dynamics: Has Management Won the Battle in the
Fight Against the Tender Offer, and What Injury has the Individual Shareholder Suf-
fered?, 9 N. ILL. L. REV. 187, 189 (1988) (tender offers are preferred method of takeover
because they are not heavily regulated); Comment, Beyond CTS: A Limited Defense of
State Tender Offer Disclosure Requirements, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 657, 659-60 (1987) (tender
offers not subject to same level of regulation as proxy contests).
' See Warren, supra note 3, at 673 ("In the absence of regulation, abuses emerged").
Concern developed over what was known as the "Saturday Night Special." See Brennan,
SEC Rule 14d-8 and Two-Tier Offers, in TENDER OFFERS 110 (M. Steinberg ed. 1985). A
"Saturday Night Special" is a "tender offer[] that [was] begun and completed in a very
short period of time-perhaps over a weekend-which precluded any rational investor deci-
sion over whether or not to tender." Fay, State Takeover Law: Shareholder Protection, The
Constitution, and The Delaware Approach, 24 GONz. L. REv. 249, 250 (1989).
8 See Boyer, When It Comes To Hostile Tender Offers, Just Say No: Commerce
Clause And Corporation Law in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 57 U. CIN. L.
REV. 539, 540 (1988); Prentice, supra note 2, at 6; Note, supra note 3, at 203-04. The first
state to enact a regulatory statute was Virginia, in 1968. Note, State Regulation of Tender
Offers Reexamined, 19 TULSA L.J. 225, 232 (1983); see Prentice, supra note 2, at 6; Romano,
The Future of Hostile Takeovers: Legislation and Public Opinion, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 457,
458 (1988); see also VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-528 to -541 (repealed 1989) (first attempt at
statutory regulation of tender offers). The federal government enacted the Williams Act
later the same year. Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1988)); Prentice, supra note 2, at 6; see also infra notes 43-49 and
accompanying text (explanation of Williams Act).
' See Comment, State Regulation of Corporate Takeovers: Legislation After CTS
Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 18 Sw. U. L. REV. 155, 160-61 n.59 (1988) ("Takeover
statutes enacted following the adoption of the Williams Act, have been called 'first genera-
tion' takeover statutes"); see also infra notes 50-55 and accompanying text (discussion of
"first generation" takeover statutes).
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commerce clause and supremacy clause grounds.'
The United States Supreme Court first addressed these con-
stitutional issues in Edgar v. MITE Corp.,9 in which it declared a
first generation Illinois antitakeover statute unconstitutional."
This led to the enactment of a "second generation""' of state regu-
lations designed to circumvent the constitutional restrictions out-
lined in MITE.'2 In CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp.,'3 the Court val-
idated a second generation Indiana statute despite constitutional
challenges similar to those raised in Mite.4 Following CTS, many
states followed the lead of a few pre-CTS jurisdictions and devel-
oped more stringent antitakeover laws now classified as "third gen-
eration" statutes. 5
These third generation enactments have become the subject of
considerable debate' due to their severely restrictive effect on
"hostile takeover" activity. 7 Recently, in Amanda Acquisition
I See infra notes 39-43 and accompanying text (discussion of commerce and supremacy
clauses); see also Prentice, supra note 2, at 10 ("[tjhe many differences between the state
laws and the Williams Act... made challenges on Commerce Clause and Supremacy Clause
grounds obvious choices").
1 457 U.S. 624 (1982); see infra notes 56-62 and accompanying text (discussion of con-
stitutional challenges in MITE).
o MITE, 457 U.S. at 646.
See Note, supra note 3, at 204 ("Many states responded to [MITE] by enacting a
'second generation' of takeover legislation"); see also infra notes 63-71 and accompanying
text (discussion of "second generation" takeover statutes).
12 See Fay, supra note 5,. at 258; see also Comment, CTS: Returning Limited Regula-
tion of Tender Offers To the State, 19 TEx. TECH L. REV. 1453, 1464 (1988)("[r]esponding
to ... MITE, state legislators formulated a new type of takeover statute").
"3 481 U.S. 69 (1987); see also infra notes 72-87 and accompanying text (discussion of
CTS).
"4 See CTS, 481 U.S. at 94. The Indiana statute was challenged on supremacy clause
and commerce clause grounds. Id. at 72.
15 See Sargent, The Historical Evolution of State Takeover Regulation, in A.L.I.-
A.B.A. COURSE OF STUDY: STATE TAKEOVER REGULATION TODAY 33 (1988) ("statutes enacted
after CTS are sometimes referred to as 'third generation' statutes, but... virtually all are
some form of second generation statute"); see also infra notes 88-99 and accompanying text
(discussion of "third generation" statutes).
16 See Block & Hoff, 'Amanda' Decision Upholds Third-Generation State Takeover
Statutes, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 14, 1989, at 5, col. 1 (discussion of debate on third generation
statutes).
17 See, e.g., Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 708 F. Supp. 984, 1000
(E.D. Wis.) (court commented that Wisconsin "third generation" statute "effectively elimi-
nates hostile leveraged buyouts"), aff'd, 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 367
(1989); RP Acquisition Corp. v. Staley Continental, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 476, 482 (D. Del.
1988) (third generation Delaware statute "exercises substantial deterrent effects on tender
offers"); Johnson & Millon, Misreading the Williams Act, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1862, 1873-78
(1989) (criticism of third generation statutes' goal of protecting nonshareholder interests).
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Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp.,"s the Seventh Circuit upheld a
third generation Wisconsin statute19 and amplified the controversy
regarding takeover regulation 0 by addressing the issue of the
courts' role in this area.2'
This Note will examine the Seventh Circuit's decision in
Amanda, and assert that the court correctly analyzed the constitu-
tional issues and properly limited the role of the judiciary in deal-
ing with state antitakeover legislation. Part One will present the
policy arguments both for and against hostile takeovers in an effort
to illustrate the reasons for the present controversy. Part Two will
discuss the corporate regulatory power traditionally reserved to the
states and the related federal limitations in order to establish a
framework for the analysis which follows. Part Three will briefly
outline the history of state antitakeover statutes. Finally, Part
Four will review the Amanda court's constitutional analysis, sub-
mit that the Seventh Circuit was correct in realizing that judicial
limitations exist in this area, and suggest that federal legislative
options should be explored.
I. THE CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING HOSTILE TAKEOVERS
Commentators have long been divided as to the societal value
of hostile takeovers.2 Supporters argue that, from an economic
perspective, takeovers provide a useful check on the efficiency of
management, 3 optimize the allocation of society's resources,24 in-
18 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 367 (1989).
" See Amanda, 877 F.2d at 509; see also Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.726 (West 1988) (state
restriction on certain business combinations involving resident domestic corporations); see
infra notes 100-127 and accompanying text (discussion of Amanda decision).
20 See Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 111, 111
(1987) ("The most lively debate in corporate law today concerns takeovers"); Note, Fear of
the Hostile Takeover: Having Tamed and Reined the Beasts, State Regulation Would Kill
Them as Well, 14 J. CORP. L. 133, 133-34 (1988) ("[t]akeover regulation constitutes one of
the most active and controversial areas of law today").
2, See infra notes 128-157 and accompanying text (discussion of Seventh Circuit's anal-
ysis in Amanda).
22 See Davis, Epilogue: The Role of the Hostile Takeover and the Role of the States,
1988 Wis. L. REV. 491, 491-93 (discussion of present debate); Kozyris, Corporate Takeovers
at the Jurisdictional Crossroads: Preserving State Authority Over Internal Affairs While
Protecting the Transferability of Interstate Stock Through Federal Law, 36 UCLA L. REV.
1109, 1142 (1989) ("positive and negative aspects of corporate takeovers have provoked an
avalanche of commentary"); Note, supra note 6, at 226-29 (discussion of debate on economic
aspects of tender offers); cf. Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus.
LAW. 101, 101 (1979) (takeovers raise "legal, moral and practical questions").
23 See Amanda, 877 F.2d at 500; Dynamics Corp. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 254 (7th
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crease shareholder wealth by providing shareholders with the op-
portunity to sell their stock at a premium price,25 and offer society
an alternative to the costs associated with bankruptcy and
liquidation.2
However, opponents maintain that both economic and public
policy factors must be considered when evaluating hostile take-
overs. From an economic perspective, opponents claim that take-
overs improperly shift management focus to the short-term,2 deny
Cir. 1986), rev'd, 481 U.S. 69 (1987); see also Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 4, at 1173
("Tender offers are a method of monitoring the work of management teams"); Easterbrook
& Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1, 21 (1982) (ob-
structions to tender offers reduce incentive for management to perform); Johnson, supra
note 4, at 67 (takeover battles are "an effective ... governance mechanism"); Macey, State
Anti-Takeover Legislation and the National Economy, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 467, 469 ("Take-
overs ... [weed] out inefficient incumbent management"); Romano, supra note 6, at 457
(free market provides discipline for management).
2 See Amanda, 877 F.2d at 500; see also Easterbrook & Fischel, Takeover Bids, Defen-
sive Tactics, and Shareholders' Welfare, 36 Bus. LAW. 1733, 1737 (1981) (takeovers result in
firms' assets being put to better use); Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, The Market
for Corporate Control, and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEx. L. REV. 1, 5
(1978) (market for corporate control leads to efficient allocation of society's resources); Gil-
son, Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offer Defense, 35 STAN. L.
REV. 51, 52 (1982) (takeovers allocate assets to most efficient users); Harrington, If It Ain't
Broke, Don't Fix It: The Legal Propriety of Defenses Against Hostile Takeover Bids, 34
SYRACUSE L. REV. 977, 981-82 (1983) (society benefits from allocation of resources to most
efficient users); Manne, In Defense of the Corporate Coup, 11 N. Ky. L. REV. 513, 518
(1984) (takeovers "reallocat[e] physical resources from less-efficient to more-efficient
users").
25 See Amanda, 877 F.2d at 500; see also Gupta & Misra, Public Information and Pre-
Announcement Trading in Takeover Stocks, 41 J. EcoN. Bus. 225, 225 (1989) ("stockhold-
ers of target firms earn significant excess returns from such offers"); Macey, supra note 23,
at 471 (evidence that target shareholders benefit from takeover); Note, supra note 20, at 140
(most studies show shareholders profit from takeovers); Note, Second Generation State
Takeover Statutes and Shareholder Wealth: An Empirical Study, 97 YALE L.J. 1193, 1194
(1988) ("Takeovers ... benefit[] all shareholders").
28 See Macey, supra note 23, at 474-75 ("takeovers are low-cost substitutes for insol-
vencies and dissolutions").
27 See Note, supra note 6, at 228 ("hostile takeovers are socially and economically det-
rimental"). See generally A. BuoNo & J. BOWDITCH, THE HUMAN SIDE OF MERGERS AND Ac-
QUISITIONS passim (1989) (addressing non-economic effects of takeovers).
28 See Dynamics Corp. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 253 (7th Cir. 1986) (managers fear-
ing takeovers worry too much about short-term profits), rev'd, 481 U.S. 69 (1987); see also
Herzel & Schmidt, Is There Anything Wrong With Hostile Tender Offers?, 6 CORP. L. REV.
329, 340 (1983) ("tender offers.., force management to focus on the short term"); Macey,
supra note 23, at 479 ("hostile takeover activity has made maximizing immediate share-
holder value ... the basic purpose of a business enterprise" (quoting Smalle, What About
Shareowners' Responsibility?, Wall St. J., Oct. 16, 1987, at 24, col. 2)); Comment, supra
note 12, at 1456-57 (takeover threat "diverts management from long-range planning"). But
see Macey, supra note 23, at 479 (attacking view that takeover threats lead to short-term
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shareholders the opportunity to benefit from long-term growth of
the company,29 and increase the overall level of national corporate
debt.30 From a public policy standpoint, opponents contend that
takeovers often result in the "bust-up" of stable companies, 31 de-
crease local levels of employment,3 2 and have a negative rippling
effect in the communities surrounding target companies.3
II. TRADITIONAL STATE POWER IN CORPORATE REGULATION AND
THE APPLICABLE FEDERAL LIMITATIONS
To understand more fully the position of the judiciary in light
of the competing policies associated with hostile takeovers, one
must comprehend the present balance between state and federal
power.3 4 Under the Constitution, powers not delegated to the fed-
eral government are "reserved to the States ... or to the people. '3 5
Traditionally, the states have enjoyed broad power in regulat-
outlook).
29 See Proxmire, What's Right and Wrong About Hostile Takeovers?, 1988 Wis. L.
REV. 353, 359-61 (predator firms are primarily concerned with short-term profit). But see
supra note 25 and accompanying text (shareholders benefit from takeovers).
1o See Brown, supra note 1, at 202 (takeovers channel society's funds into financing
rather than development); Proxmire, supra note 29, at 358-59 ("key to takeover game is
debt"); Scherer, Corporate Takeovers: The Efficiency Arguments, 2 J. EcoN. PERsP. 69, 77
(1988) ("prominent characteristic of takeovers ... is the extensive use of debt financing").
31 See Coffee, Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85
MICH. L. REV. 1, 3 (1986) ("we have entered the era of the 'bust-up' takeover"); Note, supra
note 20, at 143 ("takeovers often lead to the break-up of large companies").
The Borg-Warner situation is a good example of the "bust-up" ills associated with hos-
tile takeovers. See Proxmire, supra note 29, at 356. Once a model company dedicated to
long-term growth through research and development and manpower training, it became the
target of a hostile takeover bid. Id. Forced to incur a huge level of debt to defend against
this bid, Borg-Warner was forced to cut back on its innovative programs and now faces an
uncertain future. Id. at 356-57.
32 See Proxmire, supra note 29, at 360 ("Takeovers have led directly to the elimination
of jobs"); Romano, supra note 6, at 457 (takeovers often jeopardize management employ-
ment). But see Brown & Medoff, The Impact of Firm Acquisitions on Labor, in CORPORATE
TAKEOVERS, supra note 2, at 23 (study showing that takeovers do not lead to lower levels of
employment); Macey, supra note 23, at 478-79 (evidence that national labor unions oppose
takeover regulation).
"3 See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 646 n.* (1982) (Powell, J., concurring) (illus-
trating adverse effects on community when takeover results in corporate break-up); see also
Note, supra note 20, at 143 (noting severe effects on Akron, Ohio following Goodyear Corp.'s
defense of takeover bid).
" See infra notes 35-49 and accompanying text (discussing traditional state power and
applicable federal limits).
3' U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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ing the creation and internal governance of corporations.36 How-
ever, federal limitations do exist to the extent that a state may not
enact a law which violates the United States Constitution 7 or a
valid federal statute.3 s Accordingly, state antitakeover statutes
have been attacked on both commerce and the supremacy clause
grounds.39
6 See W. CLARK, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 75 (3d ed. 1916) (discussion of traditional
state police power); W. COOK, THE PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATION LAW 388-90 (1925) (tradi-
tional police power of states in corporate regulation); C. ELLIOT, THE LAW OF PRIVATE COR-
PORATIONS § 89 (5th rev. ed. 1923) (discussion of traditional state control over corporations);
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 304 (1971) (state law traditionally
regulates shareholder participation in corporations).
In fact, "[n]o principle of corporation law ... is more firmly established than a State's
authority to regulate domestic corporations." CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 69, 89
(1987). The United States Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have firmly adhered
to this principle. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus. v. Grieen, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977) (reluctance of
Court to "federalize .. .where established state policies of corporate regulation would be
overridden"); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975) ("Corporations are creatures of state law,.
.. state law will govern the internal affairs of the corporation"); Amanda, 877 F.2d at 502
("States have regulated corporate affairs.... since before the beginning of the nation"); Air
Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. UAL Corp., 874 F.2d 439, 447 (7th Cir. 1989) ("regulation of corpo-
rations is ... a matter of primary state responsibility").
37 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (supremacy clause); see also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,
584 (1964) (federal Constitution overrides state constitution when in conflict); Fletcher v.
Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 139 (1810) (Court invalidated state law as violation of article I
of Constitution).
38 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see also Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources
Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203-04 (1983) (Congress may expressly preempt
state authority; "[a]bsent explicit pre-emptive language, Congress' intent to supersede state
law altogether may be found from a '"scheme of federal regulation ... so pervasive as to
make ... no room for the States to supplement it' ") (quoting Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211
(1824) ("act of Congress .. .is supreme; and the law of the State .. .must yield"). See
generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-25 passim (2d ed. 1988) (discussion
of federal preemption of state action).
9 See, e.g., CTS, 481 U.S. at 72 (Indiana statute unconstitutional on commerce and
supremacy clause grounds); MITE, 457 U.S. at 624 (Illinois statute constitutional); Amanda,
877 F.2d at 496 (Wisconsin statute constitutional despite commerce and supremacy clause
attacks); National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122, 1122 (8th Cir. 1982) (Mis-
souri statute unconstitutional on commerce and supremacy clause grounds); RP Acquisition
Corp. v. Staley Continental, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 476, 476 (D. Del. 1988) (Delaware statute
constitutional despite attack on commerce and supremacy clause grounds); Batus, Inc. v.
McKay, 684 F. Supp. 637, 637 (D. Nev. 1988) (Nevada statute unconstitutional on both
supremacy and commerce clause grounds).
It has also been argued that the "contracts clause" may provide still another ground for
constitutional challenge. See Butler & Ribstein, State Antitakeover Statutes and the Con-
tract Clause, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 611, 613 (1988). Professors Butler and Ribstein contend
that "the constitutional issues surrounding state anti-takeover statutes have not been re-
solved because the Court has not considered the crucial point that the state statutes poten-
tially run afoul of the 'Contracts Clause' in article I, section 10 of the Constitution: 'No
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Under the commerce clause,40 claimants maintain that state
acts which restrict takeover activity unconstitutionally interfere
with interstate commerce.4' Similarly, under the supremacy clause,
opponents attack state antitakeover legislation on the grounds that
a valid exercise of congressional power preempts any conflicting
state action.42 In this context, state antitakeover laws have been
challenged with claims of federal preemption under the Williams
Act.43 The Williams Act requires a bidder to make certain disclo-
sures44 and "establishes procedural rules to govern tender offers."4 5
More specifically, the Williams Act mandates that a bidder who
acquires more than five percent of certain classes of stock must
disclose information concerning its background, its method of fi-
nancing, its purpose, and any arrangements it may have with man-
agement.46 Furthermore, the Williams Act sets time limits that
provide shareholders with an opportunity to consider the offer,47
ensures that shareholders tendering their shares within these limits
will receive the same price,48 and prohibits unethical practices by
the bidder. 9
State shall ... pass any... Law impairing the obligations of Contracts.'" Id.
40 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The commerce clause provides that the federal govern-
ment, through Congress, "shall have Power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the
several States." Id.
The Constitution does not explicitly prohibit the states from interfering with interstate
commerce. See L. TRIBE, supra note 38, § 6.2, at 403. Thus, this limitation on the states is
based on "the Constitution's negative implications." Id.
" See, e.g., CTS, 481 U.S. at 87-89; MITE, 457 U.S. at 640-47; Amanda, 877 F.2d at
505-09.
42 See Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1274-81 (5th Cir. 1978) (state
officials impliedly prohibited from enforcing statute that conflicts with Securities Exchange
Act of 1934); Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman, 637 F. Supp. 742, 754-56 (S.D. Ohio
1986) (enforcement of Ohio Takeover Act enjoined on, inter alia, supremacy clause
grounds).
43 See, e.g., CTS, 481 U.S. at 78-86; MITE, 457 U.S. at 630-40; Amanda, 877 F.2d at
502-05; see also 15 U.S.C. § § 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1988) (the Williams Act).
The Williams Act was enacted in 1968 in response to the increasing number of tender
offers. See Fay, supra note 5, at 250; Note, A Policy Analysis of New York State Security
Takeover Disclosure Act, 53 BROOKLYN L. REv. 1117, 1119 (1988); see also Warren, supra
note 3, at 671-73 (discussion of situation in which Congress enacted Williams Act).
" See CTS, 481 U.S. at 79.
41 See id.
46 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1)(A), (B), (C) & (E) (1988).
,7 Id. § 78n(d)(5).
48 Id. § 78n(d)(7).
,9 Id. § 78n(e).
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III. STATE ANTITAKEOVER STATUTES: A BRIEF HISTORY
The history of state antitakeover statutes can be divided into
three stages or "generations."
A. The First Generation
The first piece of legislation representing governmental regula-
tion of "hostile takeovers" was enacted at the state level in 1968.50
Federal regulation, in the form of the Williams Act, soon followed51
and by 1982 thirty-seven states had some form of antitakeover leg-
islation.5 2 Many of these statutes allowed a state to regulate trans-
actions occurring outside of its borders53 and were inconsistent
with the federal requirements of the Williams Act.5 4 As a result,
many first generation statutes fell victim to constitutional
challenges.5"
The United States Supreme Court initially addressed the con-
stitutional issues associated with first generation statutes in Edgar
v. MITE Corp.." In MITE, a Delaware corporation, seeking to ac-
See Fay, supra note 5, at 249 (discussing Virginia's 1968 antitakeover statute).
51 See supra note 6 (on enactment of Williams Act).
52 See Romano, supra note 20, at 113; see also Warren, supra note 3, at 671 n.3 (list of
states). Many first generation statutes shared certain common characteristics, such as dis-
closure and timing requirements in variation of the Williams Act. See Sargent, supra note
15, at 7 ("Many... statutes.., departed from the Williams Act in certain key respects");
see, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. AN& tit. 13 § 803(2) (repealed 1985) (containing disclosure and
timing variations of Williams Act); S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-2-90(4) (Law. co-op. 1987) (repealed
1988) (same). Another characteristic of first generation statutes is the grant of discretionary
authority by state officials "to determine the fairness of a [takeover]." See Prentice, supra
note 2, at 9 ("Many... required administrative hearings and sometimes fairness determina-
tions"); see, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 292.580 (Baldwin 1981) (repealed 1986) (including
grant of discretionary authority); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 409.515 (Vernon 1979) (repealed 1986)
(same). Some first generation statutes also included provisions which would allow a state to
regulate transactions involving either targets "incorporated within the state, corporations
with substantial assets or their principal place of business located within the state, corpora-
tions with a given percentage of shareholders residing in the state, or corporations with
some combination of these connections with the state." Warren, supra note 3, at 677-78; see,
e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1211/2, para. 137.52-10 (Smith-Hurd 1980) (repealed 1983) (contain-
ing state-nexus clause).
"3 See supra note 52 and accompanying text; see also infra text accompanying note 61
(Illinois law permitted state to regulate outside it borders).
See supra note 52 (first generation statutes often inconsistent with Williams Act).
' See Comment, supra note 7, at 164 ("courts struck down a majority of the 'first
generation' state takeover statutes"); see, e.g., MITE, 457 U.S. at 624 (Illinois statute un-
constitutional); Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Cities Serv. Co., 715 F.2d 1425, 1426 (10th Cir. 1983)
(Oklahoma statute unconstitutional).
" 457 U.S. at 624.
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quire an Illinois corporation, challenged the constitutionality of the
Illinois Business Take-Over Act.57 The Illinois Act, like many first
generation statutes, included the following: timing requirements
which differed from the Williams Act;58 an allowance for the inter-
vention of government officials to determine the "fairness" of the
acquisition; 59 and a theoretical grant of power to Illinois to regulate
a transaction involving the takeover of a "foreign corporation"
which might "not affect a single Illinois shareholder. '8 0
Stressing that the Illinois Act sought to directly regulate inter-
state commerce and that the resulting burdens would be excessive
in relation to the local interests the Act sought to protect, the
MITE majority invalidated the Act on commerce clause grounds."'
In addition, a plurality of the Court determined that the Illinois
Act was unconstitutional on supremacy clause grounds since it was
preempted by the Williams Act.2
B. The Second Generation
The states responded to the constitutional analysis in MITE
by enacting a wide variety of second generation statutes.6 3 In an
effort to avoid commerce clause violations, this wave of legislation
focused on the traditional power of the states to regulate internal
67 Id. The Illinois Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, para. 137.52-10, 137.54, 137.57
(Smith-Hurd 1980) (repealed 1983), was challenged under both the commerce clause and
the supremacy clause. Mite, 457 U.S. at 624.
'8 See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1211/2, para. 137.54(E) (Smith-Hurd 1980) (repealed 1983).
See id. para. 137.57(A).
60 See id. para. 137.52-10(2).
e See MITE, 457 U.S. at 641-46. The Court was concerned about the fact that Illinois
could regulate outside of its borders and thus held the statute to be unconstitutional as a
violation of the commerce clause. Id. at 643. Applying the "Pike balancing test," the Court
determined that the burdens imposed on interstate commerce were excessive in comparison
to the local interests the statute served. Id.; see Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142
(1970).
62 See MITE, 457 U.S. at 630-40. The MITE plurality believed the Illinois Act to be
preempted by the Williams Act for three reasons. First, it had timing requirements which
differed with those of the Williams Act. Id. at 634-36. Second, the statute contained admin-
istrative review provisions which were believed to hurt the chances of a successful tender
offer. Id. at 636-39. Third, it was viewed as an impediment to "investor autonomy"-the
right of the shareholder to make his own individual choice. Id. at 639-40.
"3 See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text (second generation statutes); see also
Black, Barton & Roth, State Takeover Statutes: The "Second Generation", 13 SEc. REG.
L.J. 332, 333 (1986) ("a number of states have attempted to enact takeover statutes
designed to withstand constitutional scrutiny"); Prentice, supra note 2, at 23 ("states
adopted a number of new strategies to remedy perceived constitutional defects").
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corporate governance. 4  Despite the various approaches
taken, 5these statutes had two elements in common: (1) they ap-
plied only to corporations incorporated within the state;6 and (2)
instead of attempting to monitor the sale of securities, they con-
centrated on regulating matters pertaining to a corporation's inter-
nal affairs, such as the voting rights of shareholders.6 7
Of the states which enacted second generation antitakeover
laws, many adopted "control share acquisition" statutes.6 Under
this approach, a bidder who acquired "more than a specified per-
centage of the issuer's stock [was required to] obtain shareholder
approval of the acquisition in order to be accorded full voting
rights or to complete the acquisition. '69 Theoretically, such stat-
utes were designed to avoid the inequities of a "two-tier" tender
offer"0 and to protect the interests of the target shareholders on a
"group" rather than "individual" basis by shielding them from the
"coercive aspects" of such offers.7 '
" See supra notes 34-49 and accompanying text (discussing traditional state power to
regulate internal affairs of corporations).
'" See Comment, supra note 12, at 1464 ("The states, to avoid the commerce clause
problem, have used several ... models"). These approaches include control share acquisi-
tion, fair price, cash out and business combination statutes. See Davis, supra note 22, at
524-25 (chart showing four major categories); Fay, supra note 5, at 260-76 (discussion of
different categories); Warren, supra note 3, at 694-700 (discussion of three major
approaches).
6 See Kozyris, supra note 22, at 1110; Prentice, supra note 2, at 23.
17 See Kozyris, supra note 22, at 1111; Sargent, supra note 15, at 19.
Is See Boyer, supra note 6, at 549-53; Sargent, supra note 15, at 23-24.
" Davis, supra note 22, at 524.
70 See CTS, 481 U.S. at 82-83. A two-tier tender offer has been described as follows:
In the first step the acquiring entity offers to purchase, at a premium price, only
enough shares to acquire a controlling interest in the company. Once the control-
ling position is established, the acquiror, in the second step, merges the target
company into itself or a subsidiary and squeezes out minority shareholders.., at
a lower price ....
Comment, Shareholder Rights Plans-Do They Render Shareholders Defenseless Against
Their Own Management?, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 991, 997 (1987); see Comment, Two-Tiered
Tender Offers and the Poison Pill: The Property of a Potent Takeover Defense, 17 PAC.
L.J. 891, 894-99 (1986).
"The ... argument, which states that [two-tier] tender offers are inherently coercive,
has many proponents." Oesterle, The Negotiation Model of Tender Offer Defenses and the
Delaware Supreme Court, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 117, 126 (1986). Professor 0esterle suggests
that "[t]he best solution for target shareholders is... collusion." Id. at 129. It has also been
asserted that two-tier tender offers should be prohibited. See Goldberg, Regulation of Hos-
tile Tender Offers: A Dissenting View and Recommended Reforms, 26 CORP. PRAC. COM-
MENTATOR 586, 594-95 (1985).
71 See CTS, 481 U.S. at 82-83.
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In CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp.,7 2 the Court, confronted with
Indiana's "second generation control share acquisition" statute, 3
was again faced with the issue of the constitutionality of state
takeover regulation. Under the Indiana Act, an entity acquiring a
"control share '74 of an "issuing public corporation 7 5 did not ob-
tain the applicable voting rights unless a majority of the remaining
"pre-existing disinterested" shareholders of each class of stock out-
standing and entitled to vote approved. 8 This provision effectively
placed the prospect of a successful hostile takeover in the collec-
tive hands of the shareholders. 7 The district court invalidated the
law on both Williams Act preemption grounds and commerce
clause grounds,7 8 and the court of appeals affirmed.79 The Supreme
Court, however, found the statute to be constitutional and
reversed. 0
On the issue of preemption, the Court found neither the pur-
pose" nor any provision82 of the Indiana Act to be in conflict with
the Williams Act. Regarding the commerce clause claim, the Court
481 U.S. 69 (1987).
" See IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-1 to -11 (West 1989). This act was more properly
known as the Control Share Acquisitions Chapter of the Indiana Business Corporation Law.
See CTS, 481 U.S. at 72.
74 IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-1 (West 1989); see CTS, 481 U.S. at 73. "Under the Act, an
entity acquires 'control shares' whenever it acquires shares that, but for the operation of the
Act, would bring its voting power in the corporation to or above any of three thresholds:
20%, 331/3%, or 50%." Id.
" See IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-4(a) (West 1989). This act applied only to certain qual-
ified Indiana corporations. See id. § 23-1-20-5; CTS, 481 U.S. at 72-73.
78 See CTS, 481 U.S. at 73-74 n.2; IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-9(b) (West 1989).
See CTS, 481 U.S. at 74.
78 See Dynamics Corp. v. CTS Corp., 637 F. Supp. 389, 395, 406 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 794
F.2d 250, 262-64 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 481 U.S. 69, 94 (1987).
71 See Dynamics Corp. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 262-64 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 481
U.S. 69, 94 (1987).
80 CTS, 481 U.S. at 94.
81 See id. at 86-87. The Court stressed that the Illinois Act protected shareholders on a
collective basis, requiring a collective vote to avoid coercion of individual investors. Id. at
82-83. The Court felt this requirement furthered the protection of shareholders, one purpose
of the Williams Act. Id. at 83.
8 See id. at 86-87. The Seventh Circuit had held the Indiana Act to be preempted due
to a provision which could lead to delays in excess of the Williams Act. Dynamics Corp. v.
CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 263 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 481 U.S. 69, 94 (1987). The Supreme
Court found that the Act did not impose an absolute delay, "nor [did] it preclude an offeror
from purchasing shares as soon as federal law permits." CTS, 481 U.S. at 84. Regarding the
preemption issue, the Court also stated that "[t]he longstanding prevalence of state regula-
tion in this area suggests that, if Congress had intended to pre-empt all state laws that delay
the acquisition of voting control following a tender offer, it would have said so explicitly."
Id. at 86.
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held that the Indiana Act was within constitutional limits,8" since
it did not treat nonresidents in a discriminatory manner s4 and
would not result in inconsistent regulation.85 In arriving at this
conclusion, the Court emphasized the traditional role of the states
in regulating corporate governance and noted that the Indiana
law in no way prohibited the actual transfer of stock.8"
C. The Third Generation
After the Supreme Court's CTS decision, a number of jurisdic-
tions followed the pre-CTS lead of states such as New York and
New Jersey and adopted what were known as "business combina-
tion statutes."' Although technically in existence prior to CTS,s9
the recent popularity of this regulatory form9" has led both courts9
and commentators 2 to refer to such statutes as part of the third
generation of state antitakeover law.
A controversial distinguishing feature of many "business com-
bination" statutes9 is that "they expressly inject target company
11 CTS, 481 U.S. at 94.
8, See id. at 87 ("[Indiana Act] has the same effects... whether or not the offeror is a
domiciliary or resident of Indiana").
85 Id. at 89.
86 Id. at 89-93.
87 Id. at 93.
11 See Davis, supra note 22, at 524-25. Business combination statutes:
Prohibit certain business combinations ... between the issuer and a large share-
holder for a specified period of time after the shareholder first acquires a large
block of stock. After the time period expires, a business combination is still pro-
hibited unless approved by a specifies shareholder vote or the bidder pays a statu-
torily determined fair price to all shareholders.
Id.; see N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 912 (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1989) (effective 1985); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 14A:10A-1 to -6 (West 1986).
11 See supra note 15 and accompanying text (although termed third generation stat-
utes, most are essentially forms of second generation statutes).
90 See Pritchard, The Case for the Constitutionality of State Business Combination
Statutes, 13 DEL. J. CORP. L. 953, 954 (1988) (list of states adopting business combination
form). "Ten states, many in the wake of CTS, have enacted so-called business combination
statutes[:] . . . Arizona, Delaware, Indiana, Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey,
New York, Washington, and Wisconsin." Id. (citation omitted); see also TENN. CODE ANN.
§§ 48-35-201 to -209 (1988 & Supp. 1989) (very recent example of business combination
statute).
", See Amanda, 877 F.2d at 497 ("Wisconsin has a third generation ... statute").
92 See Fay, supra note 5, at 250; Note, Sword of Shield: The Impact of Third Genera-
tion State Takeover Statutes on Shareholder Wealth, 57 GEO. WAsH. L. REV. 958, 959
(1989); Block & Hoff, supra note 16, at 5, col. 1 to 6, col. 3.
" See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-1201 to -1223 (West Supp. 1989); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 33-374 (d),(e) & (f) (West Supp. 1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 14A:10A-1 to -6 (West
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management into the decision-making process, giving it an effec-
tive veto power over hostile bids to be followed by 'business combi-
nations'-a veto that the bidder and target company shareholders
are virtually powerless to override." 94 This veto power is achieved
by the inclusion of provisions which delay any "business combina-
tion" for three to five years unless there has been prior approval by
the target's board of directors. 95 Although some statutes contain
exceptions, 6 these provisions have been criticized as ineffective be-
cause they fail to give shareholders any real power to implement a
change not desired by management.97 While a few "business com-
bination" statutes have been constitutionally challenged,98 the ju-
dicial approaches to the issue have been far from uniform.99
Supp. 1988); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 180.725 to .726 (West Supp. 1989).
" Johnson & Millon, Misreading the Williams Act, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1862, 1875 (1989).
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(a) (1988) (three years); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §
912(b) (McKinney 1986) (five years); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-35-205 (Supp. 1989) (five
years); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.726(3) (West Supp. 1989) (three years).
9 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-374(f) (West Supp. 1989) (unless the certificate
of incorporation otherwise provides, business combination rule does not apply to such trans-
actions between interested shareholders and a resident domestic corporation that has no
class of federally registered voting stock on shareholder's acquisition date); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 203 (1988) (same with minor changes); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-35-207 (1988) (same).
Under the Delaware statute, a bidder can avoid board of director approval if it acquires
eighty-five percent of the voting stock. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(a)(2) (1988).
' See Johnson & Millon, supra note 94, at 1875-76 (criticism of Delaware exception as
unrealistic).
" Pritchard, supra note 90, at 954; see, e.g., City Capital Assocs. v. Interco, Inc., 696 F.
Supp. 1551, 1554 (D. Del.), aff'd on other grounds, 860 F.2d 60, 65 (3d Cir. 1988) (Delaware
statute constitutional); RP Acquisition Corp. v. Staley Continental, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 476,
476-77 (D. Del. 1988) (same); BNS Inc. v. Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp. 458, 458-59 (D. Del.
1988) (same). But see RTE Corp. v. Mark IV Indus., Inc., No. Civ. A. 88-C-378 (E.D. Wis.
May 6, 1988) (WESTLAW, Allfeds database) (Wisconsin statute unconstitutional), vacated,
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) para. 93,789 (E.D. Wis. June 22, 1988). The precedential value of
the RTE decision appears to be slight at best.
.. Compare BNS, 683 F. Supp. at 469 (applying "meaningful opportunity for success"
test) with Amanda, 877 F.2d at 508 (rejecting "meaningful opportunity" test).
Courts are especially divided over the application of the "meaningful opportunity for
success" test. See BNS, 683 F. Supp. at 469. Under this test, "even statutes with substantial
deterrent effects on tender offers do not circumvent Williams Act goals, so long as hostile
offers which are beneficial to target shareholders have a meaningful opportunity for suc-
cess." Id.
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IV. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT'S CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS IN
Amanda
A. Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp.
Recently, in Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods
Corp.,100 the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit was confronted with a challenge to the -constitutionality of
Wisconsin's third generation business combination statute.'0' The
controversy arose when Amanda Acquisition Corp., a subsidiary of
a Massachusetts corporation, tendered an offer in a takeover bid to
acquire Universal Foods Corp., a Wisconsin corporation. 02
Amanda's bid was contingent, inter alia, upon its being tendered
seventy-five percent of the outstanding stock and a final determi-
nation that Wisconsin's antitakeover statute was unconstitutional
or inapplicable. 0 3 However, despite the fact that Amanda's bids
were well in excess of the market price,104 Universal Foods' board
of directors recommended that its shareholders reject Amanda's
proposals. 10 5
Subsequently, Amanda filed suit in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin seeking injunctive re-
lief on the theory that Wisconsin's antitakeover statute was uncon-
stitutional. 06 The Wisconsin statute provided: "[u]nless the tar-
get's board agrees to the transaction in advance, [a] bidder must
wait three years after buying the shares to merge with the target or
acquire more than 5% of its assets.' 0 7 Notwithstanding a finding
that the Wisconsin statute "effectively eliminates hostile leveraged
100 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 367 (1989).
101 Id. at 499; see Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.726 (West Supp. 1989).
102 Id. at 498. The sole purpose for Amanda Acquisition's existence was to acquire Uni-
versal Foods. Id.
103 See Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 708 F. Supp. 984, 989
(E.D. Wis.) (listing conditions of purchase), aff'd, 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir.1989). The only
other condition the court considered relevant was the redemption of the shareholders' rights
plan, also called a "poison pill." Id. at 989.
"0I See id. at 989. Amanda's offer eventually reached thirty-eight dollars a share.
Amanda, 877 F.2d at 498. One month previously, Universal Foods' stock had a market value
of twenty-five dollars a share. Id.
10I Amanda, 708 F. Supp. at 989.
100 Id. Amanda claimed that the Wisconsin act violated both the commerce clause and
the supremacy clause. Id. at 996-97.
107 Amanda, 877 F.2d at 497-98; see also Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.726(2) (West Supp.
1989).
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buyouts,"' 8 the district court found no constitutional violation.10 9
Thus, the requested relief was denied"0 and an appeal followed.
Despite Circuit Judge Easterbrook's lengthy critique of re-
strictive antitakeover statutes,"' the Seventh Circuit affirmed." 2
In addressing the statute's constitutionality, the Seventh Circuit
considered both the Williams Act and the commerce clause.113
Addressing the issue of preemption under the Williams Act,
the Seventh Circuit noted .the historical reluctance of federal
courts to infer preemption in areas traditionally regulated by the
states." 4 Drawing from this general doctrine, the court proceeded
to examine the language of the Securities Exchange Act of 19341"
and the views expressed in CTS. 1 6 Based on these considerations,
the court concluded that the Williams Act was designed to regulate
the "process" of a takeover bid and that state corporation law was
left to regulate substantive matters such as shareholder voting
rights. 17 The court supported this position with a long litany of
permissible state regulations of corporate governance which, de-
spite lowering the probability of successful takeover bids, would
not be preempted by the Williams Act."' Thus, the Amanda court
108 Amanda, 708 F. Supp. at 1000.
101 Id. at 1016.
110 Id.
III See Amanda, 877 F.2d at 500-02. Judge Easterbrook commented: "If our views of
the wisdom of state law mattered, Wisconsin's takeover statute would not survive." Id. at
500; see Fox, The Politics of Law and Economics in Judicial Decision Making: Antitrust as
a Window, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 554, 557 (1986) (discussion of Easterbrook as "exemplary of
the Chicago School approach to law and economics"). Traditional Chicago School doctrine
maintains that "all people and firms are motivated by price advantage alone." Id. at 558.
For a better understanding of the Chicago School view and its relation to the law, see the
articles by Judge Easterbrook listed in Boyer, supra note 6, at 545 n.30.
11 Amanda, 877 F.2d at 509.
H See id. at 502-09.
114 Id. at 502; see also Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (pre-
sumption that historical state powers are not preempted without clear congressional intent).
See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 38, at § 6-27 (discussion of presumption against
preemption).
11 See Amanda, 877 F.2d at 502. The court primarily analyzed the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 because it had incorporated the Williams Act. See id.
11 See id. at 502-05; see also supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text (CTS on
preemption).
117 See Amanda, 877 F.2d at 503.
"I See id. at 504. The Seventh Circuit noted a number of state laws that allow prac-
tices which deter not only tender offers, but also proxy contests. Id. Examples include: (1)
the ability to organize without traded shares; (2) the ability to issue stock under buy-sell
agreements where the firm has the right-of-first-refusal at a formula price; and (3) the abil-
ity to issue non-voting stock. Id.
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concluded that although "[ilt is not attractive to put bids on the
table for Wisconsin corporations, [since] Wisconsin leaves the pro-
cess alone once a bidder appears, its law may co-exist with the Wil-
liams Act."119
Examining the commerce clause claim, the Seventh Circuit
first addressed the "Pike balancing test" employed by some courts
to determine the potential deleterious effects of state antitakeover
laws on interstate commerce. 120 Noting that the CTS Court failed
to apply this test, the Seventh Circuit recognized that it was lim-
ited in considering the wisdom of state policy choices and that it
would be improper to render a judgment by balancing state and
federal interests. 121
With such restrictions in mind, the Amanda court compared
the Wisconsin statute to the Indiana Act in CTS.122 Because each
statute was restricted to regulating the internal affairs of busi-
nesses incorporated within its jurisdiction, the court stressed that
neither statute treated an out-of-state bidder differently from an
in-state bidder, and neither would lead to inconsistent regula-
tion. 123 The court also expressly rejected the "meaningful opportu-
nity for success" test sometimes used in analyzing the constitution-
ality of antitakeover regulations. 24 Rather, the court reasoned that
Supreme Court precedent has acknowledged that under proper cir-
cumstances it is within a state's inherent power to prohibit a busi-
ness combination. 2 ' Thus, "[a] state with the power to forbid
mergers has the power to defer them for three years. 1 126 While the
court questioned the statute's wisdom, it nevertheless recognized
that "[t]he Constitution has room for many economic policies,"
119 Id. at 505.
120 See id; see also supra note 61 and accompanying text (discussion of origins of Pike
test).
121 See Amanda, 877 F.2d at 505 ("CTS did not even cite [Pike]"). Citing Justice
Scalia's concurring opinion counseling against judicial balancing, the court opined that a
"closer examination" revealed that the case law actually rested on statutory facial discrimi-
nation rather than discriminatory impact. Id.
122 See id. at 506.
122 See id. at 506-07.
124 See id. at 508. The "meaningful opportunity" test was established in BNS, Inc. v.
Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp. 458, 469 (D. Del. 1988).
12 See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 126-27 (1978). The Seventh
Circuit looked to the Supreme Court's decision in Exxon Corp., which upheld a Maryland
statute banning vertical integration in the oil industry. See Amanda, 877 F.2d at 508; see
also Exxon Corp., 437 U.S. at 119-21 (Maryland statute prohibiting oil producers and refin-
ers from operating retail service stations within the state held constitutional).
2I Amanda, 877 F.2d at 508-09.
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and that "'[a] law can be both economic folly and
constitutional'. '127
B. The Seventh Circuit's Constitutional Analysis
The Seventh Circuit, in deciding Amanda, recognized the lim-
ited role of the courts in making determinations regarding the pol-
icy considerations associated with hostile takeovers.12 s Based on
the present state of the law, it is submitted that the Seventh Cir-
cuit correctly decided that "business combination" statutes, such
as the Wisconsin Act, do not violate the Constitution on either
preemption or commerce clause grounds.
1. Preemption Analysis
Because it is part of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,129
the Williams Act is subject to a provision which provides,
"[n]othing in this chapter shall affect the jurisdiction .. .of any
State over any security or any person insofar as it does not conflict
with the provisions of this chapter."'130 This, coupled with the his-
torical reluctance of federal courts to infer preemption in tradi-
tional state areas,'' creates a presumption against preemption." 2
127 Id. at 509 (quoting Justice Scalia's concurrence in CTS, 481 U.S. at 96-97); see Fox,
supra note 111, at 557 (discussion of Judge Easterbrook's economic approach); see also
supra note 111 and accompanying text (discussion of Judge Easterbrook's criticism of Wis-
consin statute).
128 See Amanda, 887 F.2d at 502. The Seventh Circuit viewed the Wisconsin act as a
state policy determination which must be respected "[u]nless a federal statute or the Con-
stitution bars the way." Id. The court found no such bar. Id.; see also Veere Inc. v. Fire-
stone Tire & Rubber Co., 685 F. Supp. 1027, 1033 (N.D. Ohio 1988) (Ohio act neither dis-
criminates against interstate commerce nor subjects activities to regulation inconsistent
with the Williams Act).
229 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1988).
'30 Id. § 78bb(a). In his concurring opinion in CTS, Justice Scalia emphasized that this
provision would either preclude a finding of preemption under the Williams Act or create a
strong presumption against it. CTS, 481 U.S. at 96 (Scalia, J., concurring). Thus, it would
seem that "[tihe plain meaning of the only statutory expression of intent ... requires a
finding that Congress did not intend that any policy reflected . . .become the basis for
preempting state laws not inconsistent with its actual provisions." Pritchard, supra note 90,
at 967.
221 See California v. ARC Amer. Corp., 109 S. Ct. 1661, 1665 (1989); Hillsborough
County v. Automated Medical Labs., 471 U.S. 707, 716 (1985).
22 See L. TRIBE, supra note 38, § 6-25, at 479 & n.7 ("there does appear to be an
overriding reluctance to infer preemption in ambiguous cases"); Cox, The Constitutional
"Dynamics" of the Internal Affairs Rule-A Comment on CTS Corporation, 13 J. CORP. L.
317, 318, 332-37 (1988). Professor Cox noted that "CTS Corp. is important ... [because] its
resolution of the federal preemption issue, consistent with the Court's recent supremacy
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However, such a presumption may be overcome with evidence of a
congressional intent that a federal law should regulate a given area
or a showing that the disputed state action impedes the accom-
plishment of a valid federal objective.133
While there is general agreement that Congress intended that
the Williams Act protect investors, ' 3  authorities are split as to the
scope of this protection.135 One view submits that "a major aspect
of the effort to protect the investor was to avoid favoring either
management or the takeover bidder."'3 6 Thus, proponents of this
position claim that Congress intended to preempt any state action
which provides an unfair advantage to either side as to the even-
tual success or failure of a tender offer. 37 However, the better ap-
proach appears to be that Congress, in enacting the Williams Act,
clause precedent, suggests a strong tendency to validate expressions of state sovereignty
absent an express indication of a congressional intent to displace state law." Id. at 318.
'3 See supra note 38 (overview of Supreme Court's preemption analysis). To determine
the intent or purpose of Congress when not expressly stated, an examination of a statute's
legislative history is appropriate. See Hamilton v. Rathbone, 175 U.S. 414, 419 (1899). "The
general rule is perfectly well settled that, where a statute is of doubtful meaning ... the
court may look into prior and contemporaneous acts, the reasons which induced the act...
and the purpose intended . . . to determine its proper construction." Id. See generally
Jones, Extrinsic Aids in the Federal Courts, 25 IowA L. REv. 737 passim (1940) (value of
legislative history in interpreting statutes); Kernochan, Statutory Interpretation: An Out-
line of Method, 3 DALHOUSiE L.J. 333 passim (1976) (same). Ascertaining congressional in-
tent or purpose based on the legislative history of the Williams Act is an area which has
produced substantial debate. See Johnson & Millon, supra note 94, at 1909. Professors
Johnson and Millon note three different interpretations of the Williams Act's legislative
history. Id. The first, adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commission, asserts that the
Williams Act was aimed at preserving shareholder autonomy-the right of each individual
shareholder to make a free choice. See id. at 1882, 1909. The second, hinted at by the Court
in CTS, submits that the Williams Act was intended to ensure shareholder protection on a
collective level. See id. at 1882-83, 1909. The final approach, and that taken by Professors
Johnson and Millon, is that Congress intended neither. Id. at 1909.
U4 See MITE, 457 U.S. at 633 (plurality opinion) ("There is no question that in impos-
ing these requirements, Congress intended to protect investors").
"' See Pritchard, supra note 90, at 967-76 (describing views varying between no pre-
emption of state protection merely because Williams Act may make some domestic corpora-
tions unattractive to potential bidders, to sole protection of investors confronted with
tender offer).
'8 MITE, 457 U.S. at 633 (plurality opinion).
"3 See MITE, 457 U.S. at 633-34. This is the position that has been adopted by the
SEC. See Brief of the SEC, amicus curiae, at 22-27, RTE Corp. v. Mark IV Indus., Inc., No.
Civ. A. 88-C-378 (E.D. Wis. May 6, 1988) (WESTLAW, Allfeds database); Brief of the SEC,
amicus curiae, at 9-35, RP Acquisition Corp. v. Staley Continental, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 476
(D. Del. 1988) (No. 88-190); Brief of the SEC, amicus curiae, at 10-30, Salant Acquisition
Corp. v. Manhattan Indus., Inc., 682 F. Supp. 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). Under this approach,
even a state law outside the scope of tender offer regulation could be preempted by the
Williams Act. See Pritchard, supra note 90, at 967.
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intended to ensure that should a tender offer be made, the ensuing
procedure would be such that neither management nor the bidder
would be favored at the expense of the shareholders.138 Recent
commentaries indicate that the legislative history of the Williams
Act must be viewed cautiously since Congress, in 1968, could not
have contemplated the modern development of hostile takeovers" 9
and that if Congress had intended to enact comprehensive regula-
tion in this area, it would have made this intention clear. 140 This
sentiment was reflected by the Supreme Court in CTS when it de-
clined to follow the MITE plurality's view of preemption under the
Williams Act, and returned to its prior decision in Piper v. Chris-
Craft Indus., Inc.141 to ascertain the purpose of the Williams
Act.142 Significantly, the Piper Court had stated, "[t]he legislative
history ... shows that the sole purpose of the Williams Act was [to
138 See Amanda, 877 F.2d at 503; see also Veere Inc. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,
685 F. Supp. 1027, 1030 (N.D. Ohio 1988). The Veere court stated that "the Court now
views the purpose of the Williams Act, not as a guarantee of a level playing field for offeror
and management.., but as protection for the investor while management and the offeror
are on the field." Id. This view has also been adopted by some commentators. See, e.g., Fay,
supra note 5, at 278 & n.144 (supports narrow view of preemptive effect of Williams Act);
Leebron, Games Corporations Play: A Theory of Tender Offers, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 153, 221
(1986) ("All the [Williams] Act requires is that states not interfere with disclosure mecha-
nisms and basic tender offer procedures"); cf. Booth, The Emerging Conflict Between Fed-
eral Securities Law and State Corporation Law, 12 J. CORP. L. 73, 73 (1986) ("Perhaps the
safest generalization.., is that federal law is based on full disclosure and state law governs
the substance").
The Supreme Court has echoed this sentiment concerning the preemptive effect of the
Williams Act in cases dealing with similar issues. See Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472
U.S. 1, 8-13 (1985) (" 'manipulative' acts under § 14(e) require misrepresentation or nondis-
closure"); Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975) ("By requiring disclosure
of information to the target corporation as well as the Securities and Exchange Commission,
Congress intended to do no more than give incumbent management an opportunity to ex-
press and explain its position"). In Rondeau, the Court stated that "[t]he purpose of the
Williams Act is to ensure that public shareholders who are confronted by a cash tender offer
for their stock will not be required to respond without adequate information." Id. (emphasis
added).
13' See Johnson & Millon, supra note 94, at 1903-13. In their article, Professors John-
son and Millon assert that judges and policymakers should not search for an "intent" that
does not exist. Id. at 1868.
10 See Pritchard, supra note 90, at 972; see also Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331
U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (federal act does not supercede state law unless that is clear and mani-
fest intent of Congress).
141 430 U.S. 1 (1977). The Piper Court is often referred to regarding its commentary on
the Williams Act. See, e.g., Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 8 n.7 (1985); Hazen,
Transfers of Corporate Controls and Duties of Controlling Shareholders-Common Law,
Tender Offers, Investment Companies-And a Proposal for Reform, 125 N.Y.U. L. REv.
1023, 1048 n.135 (1977).
"' See CTS, 481 U.S. at 81-82.
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protect] investors who are confronted with a tender offer.' u43
Based on both the wording of the statute and the modern in-
terpretation of the pertinent legislative history, it is asserted that
the Seventh Circuit was correct in its view that the Williams Act
was intended to regulate the process of a tender offer while tradi-
tional state functions, such as the promulgation of laws regarding
voting rights, were to remain the province of the states.
2. Commerce Clause Analysis
In CTS, the Court established a two-pronged test to determine
whether a state antitakeover law violates the commerce clause.'
The first prong looks to whether the state treats out-of-state resi-
dents differently from in-state residents. 145 Since the Wisconsin
Act applied equally to both in-state and out-of-state bidders,'14 6 it
would appear that the Amanda court was correct in finding that
this factor was not present. The second prong examines whether
the state statute interferes with interstate commerce by subjecting
the same activity to inconsistent state regulation. 147 Since the Wis-
consin law applied only to certain businesses incorporated within
Wisconsin, 14 it would seem the Amanda court was also justified in
finding that the possibility of inconsistent regulation was not a
problem.
It has been argued that a court must also examine the restric-
tive effects of a state enactment on interstate commerce to deter-
mine whether they are excessive in light of the local interests being
protected.149 Such a determination, called the "Pike balancing
"' Piper, 430 U.S. at 35 (emphasis added); see Veere Inc. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co., 685 F. Supp. 1027, 1030 (D. Ohio 1988); see also Pritchard, supra note 90, at 969-72 (on
Piper view).
'" CTS, 481 U.S. at 87-89; see also Hyde Park, L.P. v. Connolly, 839 F.2d 837, 844 (1st
Cir. 1988) ("[CTS] Court adopted a two-pronged test for its Commerce Clause analysis").
But see BNS Inc. v. Koppers Co., Inc., 683 F. Supp. 458, 472 (D. Del. 1988) (CTS estab-
lished three-pronged test for commerce clause analysis); Pritchard, suDra note 90, at 979
(same). The third test, under the three-pronged approach, considers whether "the statute
promote[s] stable corporate relationships and protect[s] shareholders." BNS, 683 F. Supp.
at 472.
" CTS, 481 U.S. at 87-88.
Wi ls. STAT. ANN. § 180.726(1)(j) (West 1988); Amanda, 877 F.2d at 506 ("Wisconsin.
is indifferent to the domicile of the bidder").
147 See CTS, 481 U.S. at 88-89.
14I See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.726(2) (West 1988); see also Amanda, 877 F.2d at 506
("Wisconsin's law ... regulates the internal affairs of firms incorporated there").
149 See Brief for Appellant at 17-18, Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods
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test,"'50 was employed by the Supreme Court in MITE. 5 ' How-
ever, while the Court in CTS discussed the local interest which In-
diana sought to protect in enacting its antitakeover statute,'52
there was never any mention or application of the "Pike balancing
test."'153 According to the views recently expressed by both courts
and commentators, it would appear that such a test is no longer
applicable in the takeover context.154
The Seventh Circuit's narrow view of the commerce clause
also derived support from the Supreme Court's decision in Exxon
Corp. v. Governor of Maryland,5 5 which held that a Maryland
statute 5 s banning takeovers of oil retailers by oil producers did not
interfere with interstate commerce. 57 Thus, based on the Court's
failure to apply the "Pike balancing test" in CTS and its prior de-
cision in Exxon Corp., the Seventh Circuit appears to have prop-
erly addressed the commerce clause issue in both its analysis and
conclusion.
C. The Need For Legislative Reform
Although the Seventh Circuit realized its limitations as a judicial
body, it clearly articulated its opinion that statutes such as Wis-
Corp., 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1988) (No. 89-1581).
150 See Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142-43 (1970). In Pike, the Supreme Court
articulated the test as follows: "Where [a] statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it
will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation
to the putative local benefits." Id. at 142.
5! MITE, 457 U.S. at 640, 643-47.
152 CTS, 481 U.S. at 94.
53 See Amanda, 877 F.2d at 505 ("CTS did not even cite [Pike]"); see also CTS, 481
U.S. at 86-93.
"' See CTS, 481 U.S. at 95 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[Pike] inquiry is ill suited to the
judicial function"); Hyde Park Partners, L.P. v. Connolly, 839 F.2d 837, 8,14 (1st Cir. 1988)
("There is... some support for the view that.., the Pike balancing test is obsolete"); BNS
Inc. v. Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp. 458, 472-73 (D. Del. 1988) (court failed to use Pike analy-
sis); Fay, supra note 5, at 292 ("it would seem that 'balancing' is dead for commerce clause
purposes"); Pritchard, supra note 90, at 979 (noting CTS Court did not apply Pike); Regan,
Siamese Essays: (I) CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America and Dormant Commerce
Clause Doctrine; (II) Extraterritorial State Legislation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1865, 1867 (1987)
("the Pike test is a red herring"). But see Hyde Park, 839 F.2d at 844 (Pike may be viable
in certain situations); Coffee, The Uncertain Case for Takeover Reform: An Essay on
Stockholders, Stakeholders and Bust-Ups, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 435, 465 ("some element of
balancing must survive").
:55 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
5" MD. ANN. CODE art. 56 § 157E (1988).
"I See Exxon, 437 U.S. at 125-29.
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consin's can be unfair to shareholders.1 8 This unfairness is illus-
trated in the process by which numerous states have enacted an-
titakeover regulations at the request of local management."5 9 Since
shareholders are often dispersed nationally, local management
clearly is in a better position to exert pressure on state legislatures
to enact laws favorable to their interests.6 0 Based on the limita-
tions placed on the courts in examining the fairness of state ac-
tions,""1 it appears that takeover legislation, because of its policy
implications, must be left to the legislature.6 2
A wide variety of federal legislative approaches have been pro-
posed.' An examination of previous congressional attempts to in-
158 See Amanda, 877 F.2d at 500 ("we believe that antitakeover legislation injures
shareholders").
119 See Macey, supra note 23, at 469-70 (list of states which have enacted antitakeover
laws at the request of specific corporations); Romano, supra note 6, at 461 n.11 (same).
In fact, some states have even responded with laws drafted and put into effect during
the course of a specific takeover bid. See Butler, Corporation-Specific Anti-takeover Stat-
utes and the Market for Corporate Charters, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 365, 366 (1988) ("Takeover
specific antitakeover laws are... designed to thwart on-going... hostile takeovers"); Ro-
mano, supra note 6, at 461 ("[statutes] are frequently pushed through the legislature at the
behest of a . . local corporation that is the target of a hostile bid").
160 See Macey, supra note 23, at 471. Professor Macey asserts that "most states are
peculiarly ill-suited to provide socially desirable takeover legislation because... [sharehold-
ers] are systematically underrepresented in the political process." Id.
In terms of the clout of local management, Professor Romano has noted that "[t]he
political influence that a major corporation ... could have upon... [a state's] legislature is
no surprise." Romano, supra note 20, at 123.
"6 See supra notes 35-49 and accompanying text (discussion of federal limits on state
action).
112 See Pritchard, supra note 90, at 983 ("the question [of the merits and demerits of
tender offers] is obviously far better suited to legislative than judicial resolution"); cf. Web-
ster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3058 (1989) ("the goal of constitutional
adjudication is surely not to remove inexorably 'politically divisive' issues from ... the legis-
lative process"); Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct 647, 677 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("the basic policy decisions governing society are to be made by the Legislature").
1'3 See Romano, supra note 6, at 470 ("From 1963-1987, over 200 bills regulating corpo-
rate takeovers ... were introduced in Congress"). The different approaches vary based on
the degree of federal involvement, ranging from repeal of the Williams Act, see Kozyris,
supra note 22, at 1135 (Congress should repeal Williams Act if it decides to leave regulation
to the states); cf. Leebron, supra note 138, at 221 (criticism of proponents of Williams Act
repeal), to substantial federal preemption, see Butler, supra note 159, at 378-79 (noting the
extreme of "total federal preemption"); Hazen, State Anti-Takeover Legislation: The Sec-
ond and Third Generations, 23 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 77, 110 (1988) ("it may be necessary
for Congress to enact legislation specifically preempting the field"); Kozyris, supra note 22,
at 1133-35 (noting an approach giving "maximum preemptive effect to federal law").
For an excellent overview and analysis of the history of Congressional proposals in this
area, see Romano, The Future of Hostile Takeovers: Legislation and Public Opinion, 57 U.
CIN. L. REv. 457, 470-504 (1988).
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troduce such legislation reveals that most "takeover-related bills..
.aim at making acquisitions more difficult" by imposing additional
restrictions on the bidder.' In addition, a recent trend has devel-
oped to monitor the conduct of management.'65 However, it should
be noted that "while congressional power under the affirmative di-
mension of the commerce clause undoubtedly includes the author-
ity to enact . . . federal corporation law for interstate ... entities,
the possibility for such action remains quite remote."'66
CONCLUSION
One of the most well-recognized traditions of common law is
the power of a state to regulate the internal affairs of its corpora-
tions. However, a state is constitutionally limited to the extent it
cannot enact statutes which interfere with interstate commerce or
impair a valid federal law. When a statute is challenged on either
ground, it is the role of the courts to determine whether the statute
should stand.
184 See Romano, supra note 6, at 472; see, e.g., Airline Antitakeover Bill Gains, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 19, 1989, at D5, col. 3. Recently, a House committee voted to give the Transpor-
tation Department authority to veto any proposed takeover of an airline if it believed the
deal would not be beneficial to the health of the airline. Id. However, the Transportation
Secretary indicated that "if 'this or any similar legislation' should pass, [he] would 'join the
President's other senior advisers in recommending that he veto it.'" Id.
"I' See Romano, supra note 6, at 473-74 ("1980's [marked] first time . . .proposals
[were] directed at regulating .. .managers"); see, e.g., S. 1658, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 6
(1989) (regulates management activity); S. 1244, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 4-6 (1989) (restric-
tion on management discretion); see also 135 CONG. REc. S11689 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1989)
(statement by Senator Shelby on S. 1658); 135 CONG. REC. S7327 (daily ed. June 23, 1989)
(statement by Senator Metzenbaum on S. 1244).
Commentators have also been active in making suggestions. See, e.g., Bebchuk, The
Pressure to Tender: An Analysis and a Proposed Remedy, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 911, 931-49
(1987) (proposal of remedy and discussion of 5 alternatives); Butler, supra note 159, at 378-
82 (suggests federal legislation which would provide that "shareholders... have an opportu-
nity to exit before a state statute.., becomes effective"); Davis, supra note 22, at 522 ("One
resolution ... might be federal legislation preempting state law ... [with] limited room for
the states"); Kozyris, supra note 22, at 1133-42 (creation of "interstate stock" classification).
Perhaps the most novel of these is the proposed creation of a system to classify "interstate
stock." See id. at 1154-66. Under this approach, stock that qualifies as "interstate stock"
would be subject to federal regulation as to transferability. Id. at 1110. The only restriction
that would be placed on the states would be their inability to interfere with the transferabil-
ity of such stock. Id. at 1140. Under this approach, "interstate stock" would be subject to
federal regulation designed to ensure free transferability in the market and promote free
choice among individual investors. See id. at 1154-55, 1166.
18. Kozyris, supra note 22, at 1134-35 (discussing tension between traditional govern-
ance of corporate practices by state law and federal power to regulate interstate commerce
in securities).
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In Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., the
Seventh Circuit was faced with the task of determining the consti-
tutionality of a third generation Wisconsin antitakeover statute.
Despite commenting on what it perceived as a poor policy decision,
the Seventh Circuit realized its limitations as a judicial unit. In-
stead of straining to reach an equitable result by balancing all of
the competing policy interests, the Seventh Circuit based its deci-
sion on Supreme Court precedent. In doing so, it was aware that
many of the policy issues would still remain and, thus, properly
left them to be handled through legislation.
Joseph V. Cuomo

